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I. INTRODUCTION
We are surrounded by chemicals. We rub them on our skins, ingest
them in our food, and breathe them in our air. We demand the
manufacture of more and more goods - goods made up of chemical
compounds or substances, or goods produced by processes which leave
chemical compounds and substances behind as by-products. Technology
seems to get more and more advanced every day. It can not seriously
be said that new products and industrial knowledge are not beneficial
to society, but is all this technology taking its toll on our health and the
environment?'
It is easy and convenient to ignore the prevalence and hazards of
toxic chemicals. Sometimes it takes a disaster for us to be alerted to the
dangers, and at this point it is too late to prevent the harm. The Love
* J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo School of Law, May 1994.
1. "[Ihe way chemical products impact on our lives is highly controversial. Some
say that chemicals are the mainstays of modern existence, without which the good
life would be impossible. Others point to the legacy of poisonings and environmental
contamination and rue the day when chemical synthesis first became a reality."
MARC LAPPE, CHEMICAL DECEPTION, THE Toxic THREAT TO HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1 (1991).
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Canal tragedy awakened many to the hazards of toxic chemicals.2
Smaller, more common tragedies are the chemical spills and accidents
which often result in destruction, injury, and sometimes even death.3
Moreover, some health statistics are just too flagrant to ignore any
longer. The National Cancer Institute estimates that sixty to ninety
percent of the cancers occurring in this country are a result of
environmental contaminants.! Additionally, the cancer risk increases
significantly for people working or living near a chemical manufacturer.'
Chemicals have also been implicated in causing birth defects and genetic
2. The Love Canal, located in Niagara Falls, New York, was used as a chemical
dump site by the Hooker Chemical Corporation from the early 1940's until 1953.
Robert E. Hess & Abraham Wandersman, What Can We Learn From Love Canal?: A
Conversation With Lois Gibbs and Richard Valinsky, in BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL:
ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES AND PREVENTION 111 (Abraham Wandersman & Robert
E. Hess eds., 1985). The dump was covered up, and a school was built next to the
site in 1954, with residential developments quickly following. Most of the new
residents were unaware that the land was previously used as a chemical dump. Id.
Chemical leachates, which are the liquids resulting when water seeps into a chemical
landfill, oozed from the dump site into the residential area, resulting in adverse
effects on the health of the community. ADELINE GORDON LEVINE, LOVE CANAL:
SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 1 (1982). A health study of Love Canal conducted
in 1978 revealed that 80 or more compounds were found in the dump. Ten of these
compounds were potential carcinogens, and fourteen could damage the brain and
central nervous system. Two compounds could cause narcotic or anesthetic
consequences. Others were known to cause headaches, seizures, loss of hair, anemia,
or skin rashes. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH 36
(1981). These dangerous compounds seeped out of the canal and infected the
surrounding area. Moreover, four potential carcinogens-benzene, chloroform,
trichloroethylene, and tetrachloroethylene--were found in air samples near the
contaminated area. Furthermore, a federal report indicated that Love Canal
residents had odds of getting cancer as high as one out often. Id.
3. See generally PETER N. SKINNER ET. AL., IT CAN'T HAPPEN HEREI (N.Y.S. Atty
Gen'l Office, Environmental Protection Bureau 1991).
4. S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4491, 4494.
5. See Joanna M. Miller, Oxnard Firm Ranked No. 1 For Potential Cancer Risk,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at B1. The risk of cancer for residents and workers who
are constantly exposed to chemical emissions from Reichhold Chemicals could be
nearly double that of the rest of that county. Id. The National Cancer Institute has
plotted the incidences of cancer, and has found, almost without exception, that
industrial centers, where industrial chemicals can be found- in the largest
concentrations, had the highest incidence of cancer. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4494.
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damage.' We are exposed to toxic chemicals through the food that we
eat." Chemicals can destroy our environment which protects us from
harm. For example, chlorofluorocarbons contribute to global warming,8
as well as to the destruction of our ozone.'
Such chemical dangers are frightening because we cannot discern
which chemicals are harmful to our health. Moreover, the public has
never made an informed choice to be exposed to these hazards."0 If we
can not choose whether or not to expose ourselves to these dangers, then
experts should be regulating these chemicals to prevent the dangers. If
some chemicals are known to cause cancer, birth defects, and otherwise
seriously damage human health and our environment, then they should
no longer be produced. New chemicals should be tested until proven
safe, arid only then should they be manufactured for widespread
commercial use. This analysis begins with the premise that a human
life should never be sacrificed for commercial gain.
The Toxic Substances Control Act gives the government the
6. Id. at 4495.
7. Our food can easily be contaminated by organic chemicals. Two hundred sixty
billion kilograms of hazardous chemical wastes are produced annually, and only ten
percent are disposed of in an environmentally safe manner. Curtis C. Travis &
Angela D. Arms, The Food Chain as a Source of Toxic Chemical Exposure, in TOXIC
CHEMICALS, HEALTH, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 95 (Lester B. Lowe & Arthur C. Upton
eds., 1987). During production, use, and disposal of these chemicals, many are taken
into the food chain and transferred to humans via ingestion. Id.
8. Many scientists warn that chlorofluorocarbons, along with carbon dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, and methane, because they are constantly emitted into the
atmosphere, will heat up the earth in a greenhouse effect that could eventually
produce disastrous climatic changes. Michael D. Lemonick, Global Warming: Feeling
the Heat, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 36.
9. Ozone protects us from harmful ultraviolet radiation. See infra notes 159-162
and accompanying text.
10. "Most Americans had no idea, until relatively recently, that they were living
so dangerously. They had no idea that when they went to work in the morning, or
when they ate their breakfast-that when they did the things they had to do to earn
a living and keep themselves alive and well--that when they did things as ordinary,
as innocent and as essential to life as eat, drink, breathe, or touch, they could, in fact,
be laying their lives on the line. They had no idea that, without their knowledge or
consent, they were often engaging in a grim game of chemical roulette whose result
they would not know until many years later." 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4493, quoting
a speech by Russell E. Train, an ex-Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
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mechanism to ban known hazardous chemicals,1' and to require the
chemical industry to test new chemicals and prove that they are safe."
Unfortunately, this Act has not been sufficiently utilized nor
implemented properly to protect us from the hazards of toxic chemicals.
This paper examines the little known and seldom used Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976. The history and purpose of this
legislation is discussed in Part II. The remainder of the paper focuses
on § 6 - the portion of the Act that empowers the legislature to ban
dangerous products. Part III analyzes the product bans on
polychlorinated biphenyls, asbestos, and chlorofluorocarbons that have
been attempted using § 6. Part IV evaluates the success of § 6 of the
Act in accomplishing its purpose. This paper concludes that the Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976 has been unsuccessful in saving our
environment from known hazardous chemicals, and that there is little
hope that the Act's purpose will be fulfilled.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE
In 1976, Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act
(hereinafter "TSCA" or "the Act").'" The legislature was concerned with
the estimated 1,000 new chemicals in the consumer market each year,
which subsequently enter the environment.'4 Of pressing concern was
the increasing evidence of a causal link between toxic chemicals and
such horrors as cancer and birth defects."
The purpose of TSCA is "to prevent unreasonable risks of injury to
health and the environment associated with the manufacture,
processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemical
substances." 6 Although the Clean Air Act, " the Clean Water Act, 8
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1988).
12. Id. § 2604(b).
13. Id. §§ 2601-2629.
14. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4493.
15. Id. at 4494-95.
16. Id. at 4491.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
18. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
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the Occupational Safety and Health Act,19 and the Consumer Product
Safety Acte' give the government authority to protect against hazards
to the health and environment from chemical substances, TSCA was
intended to fill the regulatory gaps and make up for the shortcomings
of these other pieces of legislation.2' In fact, TSCA was spurred by a
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1988).; 5 U.S.C. §§ 5314-5315 (1988).
21. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,4491. Congress discussed four specific regulatory
gaps. First, besides pesticides, drugs, and food additives, no other chemical substance
underwent pre-market scrutiny by any government body prior to the first
manufacture. Id. Although the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Consumer Product Safety Act protected
health and the environment from chemical substances, none of these statutes
provided for pre-market scrutiny; the government could only impose restrictions after
manufacturing had begun. Id. at 4495. Pre-market scrutiny is important because
the most effective and efficient time to prevent unreasonable risks to health and the
environment is before the toxic chemical is first manufactured, since this is the time
when the costs in terms of human suffering, jobs lost, wasted capital expenditures,
and other costs are lowest. Id.
TSCA plugs this gap by requiring anyone who wants to manufacture a new
chemical substance, or an old chemical substance for a significant new use, to notify
the Administrator of the EPA at least 90 days prior to the first manufacture. 15
U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1988). The Administrator may require the manufacturer to submit
test data for this substance, id. § 2604(b), and may issue an order restricting or
prohibiting the manufacture of a new chemical substance if it presents an
unreasonable risk to the environment, id. § 2604(f).
The second regulatory gap was that no then-existing statute, with the exception
of the Clean Air Act's regulation of fuel additives, authorized the direct control of
industrial chemicals themselves for their health and environmental effects. 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4491-92. Although air and water pollution laws authorized
limitations on discharges and emissions, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act
authorized workplace ambient standards, these mechanisms are not always effective
to protect against dangerous chemicals in consumer and industrial products. Id. at
4495. Controls which limit emissions and discharges from a given source, such as the
aforementioned statutes are called media-oriented controls. See COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONIENTAL QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES (1971), microformed on CIS No.
77-H502-3, at 760 (Congressional Info. Serv.). Media-oriented controls are ineffective
for controlling small quantities of dangerous substances, in part because it is difficult
to detect their presence in air or water. Id. Moreover, many toxic substances enter
the environment through disposal of consumer products. Once products are disposed
of by flushing into a municipal sewer line or burning at an incinerator, it is almost
impossible for a media-oriented control to deal effectively with the toxic
decomposition products which might result, because many toxic substances cannot
be removed from the media by existing treatment methods. See id. It would be more
effective to provide the authority to directly limit or prohibit dangerous chemicals in
105
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1971 report by the Council on Environmental Quality which found the
then-present toxic chemical regulation scheme inadequate.' TSCA was
designed to allow the EPA to carefully scrutinize chemicals before
manufacture or distribution to the public and "end the [then-]present
situation where chemicals [were] marketed without notification of any
governmental body and without any requirement that they be tested for
consumer products than to allow them to escape into the environment or ask the
consumer not to dispose of them. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 4491, 4496. TSCA gives the
Administrator the authority to prescribe restrictive requirements ranging from
labeling requirements to outright prohibitions for any chemical substance or mixture
which presents or is likely to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1988).
Thirdly, although agencies were authorized to regulate either the isolated
occupational, environmental, or direct consumer hazards of a chemical substance, no
agency had the authority to look comprehensively at the hazards associated with a
chemical and to consider all the risks. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4492.
Comprehensive authority to consider all the risks is important because most toxic
substances are not exclusively air, water, or occupational pollutants, but can be found
in varying degrees in air, water, soil, food, and industrial and consumer products.
The then-existing authorities could not consider the total exposure of an individual
to given substances, a consideration which would be both helpful and necessary to
establish adequate environmental standards. See supra COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY. TSCA gives the EPA the authority to look at the hazards in total. 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,4492.
The final regulatory gap was that no statute had yet to place the responsibility
for gathering information in support of a regulatory program with the persons
responsible for the manufacture of processing of the chemicals -- the chemical
industry. Id. at 4492. Requiring the chemical manufacturers and processors to
provide information about the chemicals they market is beneficial because these
manufacturers and processors are in the best position to provide this information.
Moreover, it seems fair to require manufacturers and processors to participate in
ensuring the safety of the products marketed, since the manufacturers and processors
profit from the sales. TSCA requires manufacturers to give the EPA pre-market
notice, as discussed supra in this note. Additionally, the Administrator may
promulgate rules requiring manufacturers and processors to test or have tested those
chemical substances which the Administrator determines may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, or those chemical
substances by which significant human or environmental exposure takes place or will
take place. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1988).
22. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,4493. The Council on Environmental Quality focused
on the second regulatory gap discussed supra note 21, and strongly advocated for the
use of a comprehensive approach (as opposed to a media-specific approach) to solve
the problems created by toxic chemicals. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
supra note 21, at 759-62.
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safety."' The public and the environment would no longer be "a testing
ground for the safety of these products."'
Predictably, the chemical industry was strongly opposed to this
pending legislation.' It objected that TSCA was unnecessary in light
of the other legislation schemes, and that the Act was too broad, giving
the Administrator of the EPA (hereinafter "Administrator") too much
power.' The industry also claimed that the cost of the required testing
would inflate the cost of products, consequently reducing the number of
products available, and that the legislation would stifle progress by
hampering the flow of new products. 7 The chemical companies also
feared that industry would inevitably be driven overseas.' Finally,
they argued that TSCA was burdensome to small business which would
go bankrupt trying to meet new testing costs which were estimated by
industry to fall between $100,000 and $300,000.'
Conversely, the proponents of the bill argued that the TSCA limited
the Administrator's power by requiring consideration of costs and
benefits in TSCA's major regulatory provisions." Furthermore, the
23. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4493.
24. Id.
25. J. Strom Thurmond, a Senator from South Carolina, read into the record
several letters from adamant chemical companies urging Congress not to pass TSCA.
Milliken Chemicals, Monsanto Textiles, Exxon Chemicals, Firestone Steel Products
Co., W.R. Grace & Company, Whitestone Chemical, and Ashland Chemical Co. were
the South Carolina companies opposed to TSCA. See Senate Consideration of S.
3149, microformed on CIS No. 77-11502-3, at 243-252 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
26. Id. at 243.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 244.
29. Id. Estimates of the total cost of TSCA to the chemical industry were very
diverse. The Dow Chemical Company believed that the new legislation would cost
the industry $2 billion per year. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,4503. The Manufacturing
Chemists Association estimated the costs could range from $340 million to $1.3
billion annually. Id. The EPA believed TSCA would cost the chemical industry much
less-only $80 to $140 million per year. Id. Congress relied on the General
Accounting Office's estimate of $100 to $200 million annually. Id.
30. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4500. Section 4, which relates to testing rules,
see infra note 37 and accompanying text, requires "the Administrator's considerations
[when promulgating a testing rule] shall include the relative costs of the various test
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT [Vol. 2
Administrator must publish proposed actions in the Federal Register to
allow comments and objections." Interested persons are accorded an
opportunity to be heard, and judicial review of the rules issued by the
EPA is available." The proponents also pointed out that TSCA
minimized the burdens on small businesses, as small chemical
companies would generally not be subject to some of TSCA's
requirements.33 Additionally, the General Accounting Office believed
that the testing costs estimated by the chemical industry were
inflated.' Proponents of TSCA further argued that the environmental,
health, and other benefits outweighed the economic burdens."'
The proponents of TSCA prevailed. As enacted, § 4 requires
protocols and methodologies which may be required under the rule and the
reasonably foreseeable availability of the facilities and personnel needed to perform
the testing required under the rule." 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(1) (1988). Section 6, which
relates to restrictive authority, see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, requires
the Administrator, when making rules restricting the manufacture of a chemical
substance or mixture, to consider "the benefits of such substance or mixture for
various uses and the availability of substitutes for such uses," 15 U.S.C. §
2605(c)(1)(C) (1988), and "the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of rule,
after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small businesses,
technological innovation, the environment, and public health," id. § 2605(c)(1)(D).
31. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4500.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4501-02. Most small chemical companies are not subject to TSCA's pre-
market notification requirements, see supra note 21 and infra note 39 and
accompanying texts, since most small chemical manufacturers generally don't
synthesize many new chemicals. Unlike the major companies, small companies do
not have the financial capacity to engage in the research necessary to synthesize new
chemicals. 1976 U.S.C.C.A-N. 4491, 4502. Moreover, a cost sharing procedure, by
market shares, minimizes small companies' financial responsibilities for testing
chemicals, as small companies usually have smaller market shares. Id. at 4502.
Furthermore, when the Administrator is authorizing restrictive rules, see infra notes
40-42 and accompanying text, he or she is explicitly required to weigh the economic
consequences of the rule on small businesses. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(D) (1988).
Additionally, the Administrator may exclude products developed by small businesses
if these products do not present unreasonable risks. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 4491, 4502.
Finally, small businesses may be eligible for compensation for costs and attorney's
fees if they cannot afford them. Id.; see 15 U.S.C § 2605(c)(4) (1988).
34. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4503.
35. Id.
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manufacturers and processors" to test chemicals if the EPA believes
that the chemical is either an unreasonable risk to health or the
environment or that the chemical will be produced in substantial
quantities." This section is an effective tool to gather information
about the unknown dangers of chemicals." Section 5 requires anyone
who wants to manufacture a new chemical, or manufacture or process
an old chemical for a significant new use, to give the EPA at least ninety
days advance notice.39
The EPA derives its authority to directly regulate hazardous
chemicals from § 6." If the Administrator reasonably concludes that
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal
of a chemical substance presents or will present an unreasonable risk of
injury to the health or the environment, the Administrator must make
a rule applying restrictions to the chemical substance.3 The possible
regulatory tools are an outright ban, a limit, a ban of a particular use
or concentration level, a limit on a use or concentration level, marketing
requirements, disposal requirements, and requirements that
manufacturers or processors give notice that there is a risk of injury by
the chemical substance.42  Section 6 also explicitly directs the
Administrator to promulgate rules prescribing methods for the disposal
and labeling of PCBs.43 Additionally, this section phases out the
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(3)(B).
37. Id. § 2603(a)(1).
38. David J. Hayes, TSCA. The Sleeping Giant is Stirring, 1 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 3 (1990).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1). If the EPA finds an unreasonable risk to health or the
environment, a rule may be issued, id. § 2604(f)(2), or an injunction may be obtained,
id. § 2604(f)(3).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2605.
41. Id. § 2605(a). The Administrator must apply the restrictions "to the extent
necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the least burdensome
requirements." Id.
42. Id. § 2605(a).
43. Id. § 2605(e)(1)(A) - (B). One of the reasons TSCA was enacted was to reduce
the significant health and environmental dangers created by PCBs. See 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4493-94. PCBs were specifically discussed in the report by the
Council on Environmental Quality, which was the impetus for TSCA. See COUNCIL
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manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, or use of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).4"
III. PRODUCT BANS UNDER TSCA
As discussed above, § 6 of TSCA gives the Administrator authority
to regulate hazardous chemicals if he or she finds that they pose an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.45 One of the
Administrator's choices is to ban the manufacture, processing, or
distribution in commerce of a product altogether,46 or to ban a
particular use of a product.47
The EPA has instituted bans concerning only three products under
TSCA. These three products are polychlorinated biphenyls,"
asbestos,49 and chlorofluorocarbons."
A. Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)
PCBs were singled out for mandated regulation by § 6(e) of
TSCA,5' demonstrating that the legislature considered them to be
dangerous to human health and/or the environment."2  The
Administrator was required to make rules for the disposal and labeling
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 21, at 13-14.
44. Id. § 2605(e)(3)(A); see infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1)(A).
47. See id. § 2605(a)(2)(A).
48. See infra notes 51-113 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 114-147 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 148-177 and accompanying text.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
52. Marc W. Trost, The Regulation of Polychlorinated Biphenyls Under the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 31 A.F. L. REV. 117, 119 (1989).
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of PCBs.5 The manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, and
use of PCBs in any manner other than one that is totally enclosed was
phased out.55 The final date for the manufacture of PCBs was January
1, 1979,' and the final bans on all processing and distribution in
commerce took effect on July 1, 1979." The PCB ban does not apply
when PCBs are used in a totally enclosed manner,55 or when they are
specifically authorized59 or exempted50 by the Administrator. These
limited uses are then regulated by § 761 of Title 40 of the C.F.R.6
PCBs are a type of synthetic organic chemical known as chlorinated
hydrocarbons.' Numerous types of PCBs may be synthesized, because
up to ten chlorine atoms may be attached to the parent biphenyl
53. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1).
54. "Totally enclosed manner" is defined as a manner which ensures that any
exposure of humans or the environment to PCBs is insignificant. 15 U.S.C. §
2605(e)(2)(C). Congress has subsequently determined that any exposure at all is
significant; therefore, a "totally enclosed manner" is now defined as one which allows
no PCB exposure at all to human beings or the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 761.20
(1991).
55. Id. § 2605(e)(2).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(A)(i).
57. Id. § 2605(e)(3)(A)(ii)..
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. The manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce or use of PCBs in a
manner which is not totally enclosed may be authorized if the Administrator finds
that such activities do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(B).
60. The Administrator may grant a one year exemption if he or she finds that an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment would not result and if the
petitioner has made good faith efforts to develop a safe substitute for PCBs. Id. §
2605(e)(3)(B).
61. See 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1991). See generally Trost, supra note 52, at 120-126 for
an overview of the C.F.R. regulations on PCBs.
62. Trost, supra note 52, at 117.
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molecule,' creating 209 possible PCB compounds.' The hazardous
properties of the PCB compound increase in proportion with the number
of chlorine atoms attached to the biphenyl molecule."
PCBs were originally used as cooling liquids and dielectric fluids
in electrical equipment such as transformers and capacitors, as heat
transfer and hydraulic fluids, and as coatings to reduce the flammability
of wood products, due to its high boiling point, chemical stability, and
low electrical conductivity of the compound.' Later, paints, printing
inks, dust control agents, carbonless copy paper, and pesticides utilized
PCBs.' In addition, PCBs have been used in electromagnets,' vapor
diffusion pumps,' and as plasticizers, lacquer resins and lubricants."
Moreover, PCBs are inadvertently produced as process impurities and
by-products of other organic reactions. 1
PCBs found widespread commercial use around 1929"' because of
their stability, resistance to decomposition, and excellent electrical
insulating and thermal properties.7  Additionally, PCBs are
commercially desirable because they are noncorrosive and relatively
63. An unchlorinated parent biphenyl molecule has the chemical formula C12H1,
and consists of two six carbon aromatic rings attached by an unsaturated carbon
bond. See T.W. GRAHAM SOLOMONS, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 627 (3rd ed. 1984).
Chlorine atoms replace hydrogen atoms as the biphenyl molecule becomes
polychlorinated.
64. C. J. MCDONALD & R. E. TOURANGEAU, ENVIRONMENT CANADA, POBs:
QUESTION AND ANSWER GUIDE CONCERNING POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS 2 (1986).
65. See id.
66. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Toxic SUBSTANCES: ABANDONMENT OF PCBs
DEMONSTRATES NEED FOR PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS 8 (1987) (hereinafter
"ABANDONMENT").
67. Id.
68. MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra note 64, at 5.
69. Id.
70. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 21, at 776.
71. Trost, supra note 52, at 118.
72. See id. at 117.
73. MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra note 64, at 3.
112 [Vol. 2
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nonflammable.74
The same properties which make PCBs valued in industry - that
is, their stability and resistance to decomposition 7 - also make PCBs
a hazard to health and the environment. Once PCBs are released into
the environment they decompose very slowly, actually taking several
decades to disappear."6 The EPA has estimated that in 1978, prior PCB
use had already released 150 million pounds of irretrievable PCBs into
the environment, and another 290 million pounds had already been
placed in landfills and dumps." Additionally, a total volume of
approximately 1.46 billion gallons of PCBs have remained in service."
PCBs are so persistent and widely dispersed in the environment because
of three factors: (i) PCBs do not decompose or biodegrade significantly
in the natural environment, (ii) PCBs tend to migrate widely through
natural atmospheric and water transport mechanisms, and (iii) PCBs
are able to move rapidly through the food chain because they are readily
soluble in oils and the fatty tissues of fish, birds, animals, and humans,
even though they are only slightly soluble in water.79
PCBs seriously effect the earth's ecosystem. 0 They are "both
persistent in the environment and harmful to human health, even at low
74. Id. at 2-3.
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76. ABANDONMENT, supra note 66, at 8; COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
supra note 21, at 776.
77. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,436, 37,439 (1988).
78. Id.
79. MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra note 64, at 3.
80. Id. at 7-8. PCBs are allowed to enter the ecosystem:
(i) when they are discarded in landfill sites and dumps, as are more than half
of the PCBs produced. The contaminants enter-the groundwater when washed out
from the sites, or when they are carried by rain or snow to streams or rivers, which
in turn bring them to lakes and oceans.
(ii) when they are incompletely combusted. Temperatures of 1200 degrees
Celsius are needed to combust PCBs. The typical lower temperatures used allow the
PCBs to be released into the atmosphere.
(iii) when PCBs are leaked from electrical transformers and/or capacitors,
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exposure levels."' Well-documented tests on laboratory animals show
that PCBs cause reproductive disorders, birth defects, gastric disorders,
skin lesions, swollen limbs, cancers, tumors, eye and liver disorders, and
chloracne, a disfiguring skin disorder."2 PCBs have a detrimental effect
on aquatic life, which in turn effects birds and mammals, as evidenced
by the impaired reproductivity and survival rates of these animals, as
well as their abnormal development of bones and reproductive organs. 3
PCBs accumulate in humans via the ingestion of contaminated animals
or other food, or to a lessor extent, via inhalation or absorption through
the skin.' Bioaccumulation magnifies the detrimental effects of the
PCBs - that is, they are ingested by simple living organisms, and then
passed up through the food chain in increasing levels and
concentrations.' Furthermore, because PCBs are fat soluble, they are
readily absorbed by human tissue.'
The Yusho tragedy of 1968 directly demonstrated the dangers of
relatively high exposure to PCBs. Approximately 1,300 to 1,500
Japanese people ingested rice oil contaminated with PCBs." These
people developed what is now known as "Yusho Disease," which includes
skin lesions, eye discharges, abdominal pain, reproductive amd nervous
system disorders, jaundice, edema, and chloracn e. " Moreover, evidence
of an increased cancer rate has been observed in the Yusho victims.
9
However, as it has only been twenty-five years since the Yusho tragedy,
81. Trost, supra note 52, at 118. Some PCBs are toxic even in concentrations as
low as one part per billion. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 2, at 30.
82. ABANDONMENT, supra note 66, at 9; Trost, supra note 52, at 118.
83. Trost, supra note 52, at 118. Moreover, PCBs are fatal to fish and birds.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 21, at 777.
84. MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra note 64, at 7.
85. See Trost, supra note 52, at 118.
86. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 21, at 776. See also
MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra note 79.
87. ABANDONMENT, supra note 66, at 9; MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra note 64,
at 7.
88. See ABANDONMENT, supra note 66, at 9; MCDONALD & TOURANGEAU, supra
note 64, at 7.
89. ABANDONMENT, supra note 66, at 9.
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the precise effects of high-level exposure to PCBs on long-term health
can not yet be determined.'
Around the time TSCA was being debated, PCBs were threatening
the Great Lakes. As reported in 1976, PCB levels exceeding the United
States and Canadian guidelines were commonly detected in a number
of fish species. 1 The high concentrations of PCBs in Great Lakes
organisms were linked to the reproductive failures of fish-eating birds,
and caused similar effects in mink fed with Great Lakes fish.2 The
environmental levels of PCBs in the Great Lakes were unacceptably
high, which curtailed the commercial utilization of Great Lakes fish, and
caused warnings to be issued to those who fish for sport. These
concentration levels which were commonly found in the Great Lakes fish
exceeded the dietary levels which are deleterious to monkeys.' This
data strongly suggests that local PCB levels were a grave threat to local
human health and the environment at the time TSCA was passed.
Much confusion has surrounded the PCB disposal regulations
promulgated under TSCA due to preemption issues under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Section 18 of
TSCA95 rules that state law is preempted if EPA makes a rule under §
5 or § 6 of TSCA which is designed to protect against a risk of injury to
health and the environment, except if (i) the rule is imposed under §
6(a)(6),' (ii) the state rule is identical to the EPA's rule, (iii) the state
rule is adopted under the Clean Air Act or any other Federal Law, or
(iv) the state law prohibits the use of the chemical.
Citizens often actively oppose local toxic waste disposal facilities
because of the negative effect the facilities will have on property values,
90. Id.
91. GREAT LAKES RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD, GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
RESEARCH NEEDS: A REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 17 (1976).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 761.60-761.79 (1992).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (1988).
96. This is called the parenthetical exception, and allows state law to prevail if the
rule prohibits or regulates the disposal of a chemical. See Trost, supra note 52, at
126.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B).
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and the stigma surrounding a disposal site, as well as the fear of air
pollution, groundwater pollution, accidents, chemical exposure, and
aesthetic harm." This is called the "not in my backyard" syndrome, or
NIMBY.9
States or local municipalities will use their police power to issue
laws which are either directly or indirectly designed to ban all PB
disposal in that jurisdiction.' The regulations under TSCA"'. allow
for disposal of PCBs, but give requirements to ensure that the toxic
chemicals are disposed of in a manner which is least likely to cause
injury to health or the environment. The conflicting federal and state
or local regulations create preemption issues.' 2
To this date, the Fifth Circuit is the only federal appellate court to
interpret § 2617 of TSCA."' In Rollins Environmental Services (FS),
Inc. v. Parish of St. James,'4 the Fifth Circuit held that a parish
ordinance indirectly prohibiting the disposal of PCBs in its jurisdiction
was preempted by TSCA."'
98. Michele McAninch Miller, Note, Environmental Law--Federal Preemption of
Local PCB Ordinance Under the Toxic Substances Control Act-Rollins
Environmental Services (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 461, 461
(1987); Patrick O'Hara, Comment, The N.I.M.B.Y. Syndrome Meets the Preemption
Doctrine: Federal Preemption of State and Local Restrictions on the Siting of
Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities, 53 LA. L. REV. 229, 231 (1992).
99. O'Hara, supra note 98, at 229-30. Although communities are hostile to the
disposal of hazardous wastes in their own particular city, county, or parish, they
usually support the goal of safe disposal of the wastes as long as the facility is located
in someone else's backyard. Id. Commentators believe that NIMBY is a
"well-founded recognition that government and business are either unwilling or
unable to protect the public from harm." Id. at 230.
100. Trost, supra note 52, at 126.
101. See supra note 94.
102. See Trost, supra note 52 , at 126.
103. The Eleventh Circuit, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Broadwater,
758 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1985), did not address a preemption issue under TSCA, and
instead dismissed on procedural grounds.
104. 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 629. Rollins located a PCB disposal facility about one-quarter mile
from an elementary school. Id. at 630. In response, St. James enacted an emergency
ordinance prohibiting the disposal of PCBs, but then replaced that ordinance with a
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Preemption of state statutes or local ordinances by TSCA depends
on the particular circumstances of each case.1" In effect, the district
courts analyze each case to determine whether the facts fit any of the
exceptions of § 18. If a § 18 exception applies, the state or local law will
prevail, but in the absence of an exception the federal TSCA will
preempt those laws.
At first it may seem ironic that TSCA, a statute designed to protect
health and the environment, is used to mandate the dumping of toxic
chemicals while the state and local governments are trying to protect
against the dangers of these chemicals. However, because the total
elimination of hazardous wastes is highly unrealistic in the foreseeable
future, the best we can do is to make the greatest possible effort to
dispose of them safely. Although NIMBY is an understandable reaction
to the dangers of toxic chemicals, it is not a realistic or prospective
response because it does not solve the problem. If wastes cannot be
disposed of in any backyard, then what will happen to them? Perhaps
they will be illegally and unsafely dumped, ultimately resulting in
greater health and environmental hazards due to the absence of the
safeguards prescribed under TSCA's regulations. 7
In this respect, preemption under § 2617 of TSCA is a beneficial
solution. PCBs will be disposed of in a manner most likely to prevent
injury to health and the environment. Perhaps state or local laws
banning PCB disposal should be given effect only in cases where there
is an imminent, demonstrable health hazard should the disposal be
allowed.
new ordinance regulating the commercial solvent cleaning business. Id. This second
ordinance had the same effect of prohibiting all disposal of PCBs, but was a "sham"
designed to avoid preemption. Id. at 635. The court saw through the subterfuge and
found that St. James' ordinance did conflict with TSCA. Id. at 634. Since Congress
explicitly preempted the area of PCB disposal in TSCA, and since none of the
statutory exceptions applied, the local ordinance was preempted. Id. at 633-35.
106. See 84 A.L.R. Fed. 913 (1987). Compare Warren County v. North Carolina,
528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. N.C. 1981) (holding that a county ordinance prohibiting
storage, dumping, or other disposal of PCBs is preempted by TSCA) with SED, Inc.
v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio, 1981) (holding that city ordinance
was not preempted because it fell into the exception of§ 2617(a)(2)(B)(ii) of TSCA, as
the ordinance was enacted under the Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)).
107. "If every locality were able to dodge responsibility for and participation in this
[TSCA disposal] program through artfully designed ordinances, the national goal of
safe, environmentally sound toxic waste disposal would surely be frustrated."
Rollins, 775 F.2d at 637.
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In a 1987 report,' the General Accounting Office (GAO) discussed
several other problems with the PCB program under TSCA. Congress
asked the GAO to examine the program upon becoming concerned with
the improper disposal and abandonment of millions of pounds of PCB
material that was occurring despite TSCA and its regulation of PCB
disposal. 9 The GAO found that there was limited oversight of the
Regional Administrators by the EPA headquarters, and lack of sufficient
guidance to the regions for controlling PCBs."' Specifically, there was
no nationwide criteria for disposal permits, a factor that contributes to
the difficulty in enforcement and compliance with the PCB
regulations.'' Next, the GAO found that permits are only required for
PCB disposal facilities, leaving intermediate operators regulation-free,
despite the large amounts of PCBs often handled by these intermediate
operators."' Lastly, the GAO found that the EPA did not pursue the
enforcement actions that may have prevented the abandonment of such
a large amount of PCBs."'
Overall, the PCB ban seems to be effective in that it has stopped
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, and use of PCBs.
However, the disposal of existing PCBs needs to be improved. As the
GAO has recommended, oversight of and guidelines for disposal are
areas which can be tightened up. Without proper oversight and
guidelines, companies may inadvertently create environmental hazards
because they do not know that what they are doing is hazardous.
Furthermore, diligent enforcement of the regulations is critical. TSCA's
PCB regulations put a workable framework in place - now follow-up is
necessary to make them work.
108. ABANDONMENT, supra note 66.
109. See id. at 2.
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. The GAO report was prompted when SED, Inc., an intermediate PCB
operator went out of business in April of 1985, subsequently abandoning
approximately seven million pounds of PCB materials and equipment at two of its
sites. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 4.
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B. Asbestos
In 1989, under its § 6 authority, the EPA issued its final rule
prohibiting "the future manufacture, importation, processing, and
distribution in commerce of asbestos in almost all products....""" This
ban on asbestos was the first time the EPA, on its own, used TSCA to
issue a comprehensive ban on a chemical,"5 as the comprehensive ban
on PCBs"' was mandated by Congress.'17
Asbestos. 8 is very prevalent in our society. It is very widely used,
particularly in the construction industry,"' because it is a relatively
cheap material with special chemical and physical properties that make
it virtually indestructible."' Asbestos is stable, chemically resistant
(especially to acids), fire resistant,'21 mechanically strong, flexible, a
good insulator, and has a high length-to-diameter ratio and good friction
and wear characteristics. 2 In the past fifty years, asbestos has been
used in thousands of products with thousands of applications, both
114. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,460 (1989). This rule banned approximately 94% of
the United States' asbestos consumption. Id. at 29,468. See infra note 136 for a list
of the products covered by the ban.
115. 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1496, 1496 (Jan. 17, 1992).
116. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 115.
118. Asbestos is a naturally occurring mineral or hydrated silicate. Maxine
Mueller Hinze, Health Hazards Associated with Asbestos Exposure: Implication for
the Construction Industry, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ASBESTOS REMOvAL 10 (Jimmie
Hinze, ed., 1988). There are six types of asbestos, the most common kind in the
United States being chrysotile. Id.
119. Id.
120. Leslie Michaels & Seymour S. Chissick, Introduction, in ASBESTOS:
PROPERTIES, APPLICATIONS, AND HAZARDS 1, 2 (Leslie Michaels & Seymour S.
Chissick, eds., 1979).
121. "Asbestos" is derived from a Greek word meaning "unquenchable." In fact,
its fire resistence is one of its best known properties. William D. Buchanan,
Asbestos-related Diseases, in ASBESTOS: PROPERTIES, APPLICATIONS, AND HAZARDS
395, 395 (Leslie Michaels & Seymour S. Chissick, eds., 1979).
122. Michaels & Chissick, supra note 120, at 2.
119
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
commercial and construction, in the United States.'23
Asbestos causes many adverse health effects. These problems were
not generally known to the public until after the early 1960s, although
there was medical evidence of asbestos-related diseases in the United
States and Europe as early as the 1930s."' Asbestos has the ability to
fragment into tiny microscopic fibers which remain airborne."' These
fibers are then inhaled deeply into the lungs, causing detrimental health
implications."'
Several diseases can occur as a result of inhalation of asbestos
fibers. Asbestosis is a disease produced from asbestos inhalation. 7
It is a fibrotic, incurable chronic disease that is disabling and
life-shortening; the victim usually dies from cardiac complications." 8
Additionally, asbestos is associated with several types of cancer.
Mesothelioma is a very rare form of cancer almost exclusively linked to
asbestos exposure."' Mesothelioma takes the form of a malignant
tumor" that is inoperable and always fatal, and may occur after only
123. John Klamann, Professional Liability on Asbestos Abatement Projects, in
CURRENT IsSUES IN ASBESTOS REMOVAL 4, 4 (1988).
Asbestos has been used in:
(i) cement pipes used for water and fire protection systems, sewer pipes, and storm
drain pipes;
(ii) building and construction materials including thermal insulation products,
fireproofing materials, acoustical plaster, spackling and dry wall compound products,
fire resistant partitions, shingles, siding, flooring, and roofing materials;
(iii) commercial products including theater curtains, welding blankets, firemen's
gloves, brake linings, clutch facings, and electrical wire insulation; and
(iv) acid resistant applications such as acid pumps, valves, packings, gaskets, and
battery boxes. Id. It is estimated that over 3,000 common products contain asbestos.
Hinze, supra note 118, at 10.
124. Mary A. Finn, Evaluation of Air Quality Methods in the Asbestos Work Area,
in CURRENT ISSUES IN ASBESTOS REMOVAL 1,1 (1988).
125. Hinze, supra note 118, at 11.
126. Id.
127. Michaels & Chissick, supra note 120, at 9.
128. Hinze, supra note 118, at 11.
129. Id. Mesothelioma is chiefly associated with blue asbestos, but not limited to
that type. Michaels & Chissick, supra note 120, at 11.
130. Michaels & Chissick, supra note 120, at 11.
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very limited or merely casual exposure.13' Mortality from lung cancer
is also linked to asbestos, particularly if the victim is also a smoker.'32
Moreover, persons who have been exposed to asbestos have a higher
incidence of gastrointestinal cancers of the larynx, pharynx, esophagus,
stomach, kidney, colon, and rectum.'33
In 1989, based on studies and public comments, the EPA issued a
comprehensive asbestos ban 34 after concluding that asbestos was a
potential carcinogen at all levels of exposure, regardless of the asbestos
type or fiber size, and considered asbestos an unreasonable risk to
human health."5 In the final rule, asbestos was banned and phased
out in three stages. 36 The EPA estimated that the bans would prevent
202 needless deaths in thirteen years.37
Unfortunately, the short-lived asbestos ban never had a chance to
work. In 1991, a little over two years after the final asbestos rule was
promulgated, the Fifth Circuit overturned the rule because it was not
supported by substantial evidence.'38 This "substantial evidence"
standard is different than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the
131. Hinze, supra note 118, at 11.
132. Id.
133. Id. See also Michaels & Chissick, supra note 120, at 11.
134. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
135. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207-8 (5th Cir. 1991).
136. See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,461-62 (1989).
The products covered by each phase were:
(1) Stage 1: August 27, 1990: asbestos-containing floor materials, clothing, roofing
felt, corrugated and flat surface materials, pipeline wrap and new asbestos uses;
(2) Stage 2: August 25, 1993: asbestos-containing friction products and certain
automotive products or uses;
(3) Stage 3: August 26, 1996: other asbestos-containing automobile products or uses,
building materials, and cement shingles. Id.
137. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,468. This analysis was limited to deaths by mesothelioma,
lung cancer, and gastrointestinal cancer, and did not consider cases of asbestosis and
other diseases which would be avoided, or the avoided costs of treating asbestos
diseases. Id.
138. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). Section 17
of TSCA provides that a final rule promulgated under § 6(a) shall be overturned if
it is not supported by substantial evidence in the rule making record. 15 U.S.C. §
2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
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Administrative Procedure Act,'39 and is generally considered to be more
rigorous.14 The court found that the EPA did not meet this standard
because the EPA did not evaluate and weigh alternatives which would
be less burdensome to the asbestos industry but still protect the
environment adequately,"' and because they did not evaluate the
toxicity of asbestos substitutes."' The EPA has yet to attempt another
asbestos ban.
Asbestos has been a publicly known cancer-causing agent since the
1960s."' It was one of the dangers contemplated by Congress when
debating TSCA.'" The EPA needs to follow the requisite procedure
and attempt another ban. The EPA needs to weigh the less burdensome
requirements to determine whether a ban is the only method sufficient
for protection of health and the environment. There is reason to believe
only a ban will accomplish TSCA's objectives because asbestos fragments
into invisible airborne fibers which, by their nature, cannot be
neutralized by use limitations or labeling requirements."'
Furthermore, the toxicity of asbestos alternatives must be determined.
The EPA indicated in 1989 that asbestos substitutes either do exist or
will soon exist."6 The Fifth Circuit was most likely motivated by
economic concerns (as opposed to health concerns) when they vacated
the asbestos ban, since asbestos is used in many commercial products
produced and sold by the United States."7 If these substitutes are not
toxic and not harmful to health or the environment, the court may be
more receptive to an asbestos ban.
139. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
140. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213-14.
141. Id. at 1215.
142. Id. at 1221-22. "[A] death is a death, whether occasioned by asbestos or by
a toxic substitute product, and the EPA's decision not to evaluate the toxicity of
known carcinogenic substitutes is not a reasonable action under TSCA." Id. at 1221.
143. See supra note 124.
144. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4494.
145. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
146. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (1989).
147. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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C. Fully Halogenated Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
The third product banned under § 6 of TSCA is fully halogenated
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), also known as fully halogenated
chlorofluoroalkanes"' CFCs are chemicals which contain both chlorine
and fluorine, and sometimes hydrogen."' When present, hydrogen
helps to destruct CFC molecules once the molecules are released into the
atmosphere.5 ' A fully halogenated CFC is the worst kind of CFC
because it has no hydrogen. CFCs do not occur naturally, but must be
man-made.5 '
To chemical producers and consumers, CFCs are "wonder
chemicals" used in many life-enhancing products during the 20th
century.1 2  They are used as coolants in refrigerators and air
conditioners, as foaming agents for Styrofoam insulation and foam
rubber, as solvents for computer chips and dry cleaning, as well as
industrial solvents, and as propellants for aerosol spray products."1
Two billion pounds of CFCs are produced annually, and the average
consumption per person per year in this country is 2.5 pounds.'54 CFCs
are widely used because of their beneficial commercial properties such
as chemical stability, non-corrosiveness, non-flammability, non-toxicity, 55
and because they are inexpensive.5
Although CFCs are not toxic in their own right,5 ' they deplete the
148. 40 C.F.R. pt. 762. CFCs were given the trade name "freon" by Dupont, a
major producer of the chemical. Orval E. Nangle, Stratospheric Ozone: United States
Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 531, 533 n.1 (1989).
149. Nangle, supra note 148, at 533.
150. DOUGLAS G. COGAN, STONES IN A GLASS HOUSE 19 (1988).
151. Nangle, supra note 148, at 533.
152. COGAN, supra note 150, at 2.
153. Id.; Nangle, supra note 148, at 533 n.1.
154. COGAN, supra note 150, at 3.
155. Nangle, supra note 148, at 533.
156. COGAN, supra note 150, at 2. Most CFCs sell for less than $1.00 per pound.
Id.
157. See Nangle, supra note 148, at 533.
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ozone158 which protects life on earth from harmful ultraviolet rays.' 9
Ozone is absolutely essential to life on earth because ozone absorbs
ultraviolet radiation, thus preventing most of the radiation from
reaching the earth's surface. 6 ' Ultraviolet radiation is dangerous
because it causes sunburn, skin cancer, and alters DNA, along with
other biological effects.16 ' Once CFCs reach the ozone layer, the
ultraviolet light breaks them down and the resulting byproducts act as
catalysts which transform ozone into mere oxygen, thus destroying the
ultraviolet filter. 6 '
Since 1969 there has been a drop, from 1.7% to 3%, in the ozone of
the earth's atmosphere, and the decline appears to be outside of the
range of natural forces."u In fact, there is a huge hole in the ozone
which is roughly the size of the continental United States, and allows
50% more of the harmful ultraviolet radiation to pass through the
atmosphere to the earth.' CFCs have caused this hole, and a general
loss of significant amounts of ozone at the mid-latitudes.' The
stability of CFCs makes them very persistent in the earth's
atmosphere."s Even if all the CFCs on earth disappeared right now,
the CFCs already in the atmosphere would remain and destroy the
158. COGAN, supra note 150, at 2.
159. Nangle, supra note 148, at 532.
160. Id. at 535.
161. Id.
162. COGAN, supra note 150, at 2. The amount of ozone is usually maintained at
an equilibrium as a result of the simultaneous formation and destruction processes.
When the ultraviolet radiation breaks down the CFCs, chlorine atoms are released
which catalyze the destruction process, resulting in a net decrease of ozone. Nangle,
supra note 148, at 537.
163. COGAN, supra note 150, at 2.
164. See id. at 1.
165. Nangle, supra note 148, at 532.
166. COGAN, supra note 150, at 2. The atmosphere's "sinks," which are natural
processes which cleanse the air, are unable to remove CFCs. Nangle, supra note 148,
at 536.
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ozone for approximately the next 100 years." 7
In 1977, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),"' CFCs
were banned in aerosol propellants"' in food, drugs, medical devices,
and cosmetics. 7 ' The remaining aerosol uses were banned in 1978
under TSCA.'7' The regulations under the two statutes fit together so
that if a CFC is not a TSCA chemical, it is a FDCA substance, and vice
versa.
7 2
TSCA prohibits the manufacture,7 1 processing,1 74  and
distribution in commerce 171 of any aerosol use of CFCs except for
essential uses 176 or when exempted. 77  The CFC ban is not a
comprehensive ban like the PCB and attempted asbestos bans, as it only
applies to CFCs which are fully halogenated and used in aerosol
products.
167. See id.
168. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-337 (1988).
169. Aerosol propellants result in an immediate release of CFCs into the
atmosphere. Nangle, supra note 148, at 535-36. Aerosol propellants are a minor use
of CFCs. See COGAN, supra note 150, at 20.
170. Nangle, supra note 148, at 540.
171. 40 C.F.R. pt. 762 (1991). See also Nangle, supra note 148, at 540-41.
172. Nangle, supra note 148, at 541.
173. 40 C.F.R. § 762.45 (1991).
174. Id. § 762.50.
175. Id. § 762.55.
176. Id. § 762.58. Mercaptan stench warning devices, release agents for plastic
molds, certain uses of flying insect pesticides, and diamond grit spray are among the
essential uses allowed by the regulations. See id.
177. Id. § 762.59. Inkless fingerprinting systems were exempt until August 1,
1981, and conditional exemptions for two pesticides still exist. See id. The Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (ratified by U.S. March 14, 1988), further regulates CFCs. See
generally Nangle, supra note 148, at 546-65. The Protocol is aimed at cutting CFC
use in half by the end of the century. COGAN, supra note 150, at 4.
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IV. HAVE TSCA PRODUCT BANS WORKED?
Before TSCA was passed, it was characterized as the solution to all
of our toxic woes - it would fill in the regulatory gaps, allow the
government to protect the health and environment by detecting,
banning, or otherwise regulating dangerous chemicals before
manufacture, and allow comprehensive control of chemicals.178 Why
have not we heard more about TSCA? Has TSCA, particularly § 6,
worked?
In order for product bans to be effective, common sense dictates that
they must first be used. Section 6 of TSCA, which gives the EPA
authority to ban products,17 has rarely been used in the seventeen
years since the statute has been passed. The only two products that the
EPA has comprehensively banned are PCBs, as mandated by
Congress,'80 and asbestos, which was overturned in federal court.'8'
The EPA also banned the aerosol uses of CFCs. 8' Although rules
regulating asbestos and the testing of dibenzo-p-dioxins/dibenzofurans
are also issued, these products are not banned.'83 Bad-a( tor chemicals
such as kepone, arsenic, vinyl chloride, mercury, and rarious other
heavy metals were condemned in the legislative history of TSCA, 8' but
never banned or even regulated by less burdensome requirements. The
probable reason is that the government is reluctant to restrict these
chemicals because of pressure from chemical manufacturers and
processors who make large profits from selling products containing these
dangerous chemicals. It is also possible that the EPA is overburdened
with environmental responsibilities and therefore has been unable to
carry out its obligations under TSCA very efficiently.
Even when comprehensive chemical bans have been issued under
TSCA, the harmful effects of the prohibited chemical have not
178. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. See generally 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,4491-99.
179. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1988).
181. See supra notes 134, 138 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
183. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 762, 766 (1991).
184. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4494.
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disappeared. In 1985, the Great Lakes Advisory Board's research has
demonstrated that a significant cumulative mortality has occurred in
lake trout exposed to ambient Great Lakes concentrations of PCBs even
though PCBs could not be manufactured after January 1, 1979."'
However, the PCBs still in the Great Lakes six years after the final ban
can be at least partially attributed to the persistent nature of PCBs 8 '
rather than the inadequacy of TSCA's comprehensive ban. Once PCBs
are released into the environment, they will not disappear just because
other additional PCBs will not be produced.
The rejection of EPA's asbestos ban and phase-out 87 was a huge
failure for TSCA. This ruling indicates that product bans will not be
upheld by the courts, and renders EPA's banning authority under § 6
meaningless. The EPA has yet to attempt another ban on asbestos.
Environmentalists say that the decision marked the "death knell" for §
6 of TSCA and proved that the entire statute is inadequate to regulate
hazardous chemicals. 88
Asbestos is a Group A carcinogen, that is, a known cancer-causing
agent in humans.'89 It is one of the specific dangers which TSCA was
enacted to abate.' The causal link between asbestos and cancers, as
well as other debilitating diseases, has been known since the 1960s.'
If a ban and phase-out of a known and dangerous carcinogen like
asbestos has failed, certainly an unfavorable precedent has been set for
future attempts to ban other products.
The rejected asbestos ban was the first comprehensive ban which
the EPA attempted to issue.' The ruling will have a substantial
impact on future rule making because the court rejected the rule based
185. GREAT LAKES SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL
SOVIET COMMISSION, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1985).
186. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
187. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). See also
supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
188. 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1496 (Jan. 17, 1992).
189. See 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1338 (Nov. 6, 1992).
190. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4494.
191. See Finn supra note 124 and accompanying text.
192. See Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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on the very manner in which the EPA developed it under § 6.'9'
However, the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision does not foreclose a
comprehensive asbestos ban, but indicates that while the court will
review the process that the EPA used to balance the evidence, the court
is unwilling to evaluate the evidence for the EPA.194 The court may
uphold a future ban if the EPA follows procedure and considers the
proper factors when drawing its conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit characterized the asbestos ban as the "death
penalty alternative" - the most burdensome solution to the asbestos
problem. 9 The court believed a cheaper alternative should have been
used.'96 As the EPA is required by TSCA to consider the economic
consequences of product bans,'97 there will always be a more
economical (i.e., cheaper to the chemical industry) alternative. The
unfortunate reality is that toxic chemicals like asbestos, which fragment,
remain invisible in the air, and then easily enter workers' lungs, will not
be neutralized by labels and strict workplace rules. It is unfortunate
that the court will not give "human lives saved" and "environmental
tragedies avoided" the weight which they deserve in a cost/benefit
analysis. Comparing the above factors with money is like comparing
apples with oranges. Until health and the environment are weighted
appropriately in an a balancing situation, comprehensive product bans
193. 15 Chem. Reg. Rep.(BNA) 1496 (January 17, 1992).
194. "While we can, and in this opinion do, question the agency's reliance upon
flawed methodology and its failure to consider factors and alternatives that TSCA
explicitly requires it to consider, we do not sit as a regulatory agency ourselves.
Decisions such as the EPA's decision to treat various types of asbestos as presenting
similar health risks properly are better left for agency determination and, while the
EPA is free to reconsider its data should it so choose when it revisits this area, it also
is free to adopt similar reasoning in the future." Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d
at 1229.
195. 947 F.2d at 1215. Less burdensome solutions, such as prohibiting uses in
excess of a specific concentration level, labellingrequirements, disposal requirements,
and notice requirements are enumerated by §2605(a) of TSCA. 15 U.S.C. §
2605(a)(1988).
196. Id. at 1217.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(D) (1988).
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will always lose, and so will the human race and life on earth.198
The inefficiency of TSCA's chemical testing program, as well as
EPA's ineffective implementation of the Act, contribute to the lack of §
6 product bans. In order for the EPA to ban or otherwise restrict any
chemical substance or mixture, the chemical must first present, or be
likely to present, an unreasonable risk to the health or the
environment.' The EPA relies in part on chemical tests and studies
when evaluating unreasonableness,"0 ' thus § 4 chemical testing has a
direct relationship to the EPA's product bans.
The chemical testing program under TSCA has generally been
considered a failure."0' According to Don R. Clay, ex-director of EPA's
Office of Toxic Substances (OTS), TSCA's major failure has been EPA's
inability to get test data on existing chemicals."2 Only one final test
rule has been issued under TSCA, and that rule took three years to
finalize."3 Moreover, the EPA's review of pre-manufacture notices for
new chemicals rarely prompted any agency action; the EPA would
typically ignore the notice and allow the 90-day waiting period to expire,
thus allowing anyone to manufacture any chemical. 4
One of the problems with TSCA's testing scheme is that it relies on
the chemical industry's self-reporting.' TSCA requires manufacturers
198. "In comparing risks, costs, and benefits, however, it is important to recognize
that one is weighing noncommensurates, and it is not feasible to reach a decision just
on the basis of quantitative comparisons. The burdens of human suffering and
premature death are extraordinary and must be given full consideration in such
decisions." 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4503.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1988).
200. See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1207.
201. See 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 8, 8-9 (May 3, 1985).
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id. The lone test rule is for dibenzo-p-dioxins/dibenzofiurans. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 766 (1991).
204. David J. Hayes, The Potential For New Life in an 'Old' Statute: The Toxic
Substances Control Act in its 13th Year, 13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 57, 62 (April 21,
1989).
205. Glenn Frankel, The Tragedy of TOSCA: Chemical Poisoning the EPA Can't
Control, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY 42,44-45 (July/August 1979); Hayes, supra note
204, at 59 (agency still relies heavily on "self-confessors").
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to test or have tested any chemicals which the Administrator determines
may present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment."°
There is no incentive for chemical manufacturers to supply the
Administrator with truthful information indicating an unreasonable risk
may exist, because such information will result in costly testing
requirements for the manufacturer."7 Moreover, the EPA takes a long
time and indeed is reluctant to promulgate test rules."'8  The
expeditious voluntary testing agreements once entered into between
chemical manufacturers and the EPA were found to violate TSCA's
statutory mandate in National Resource Defense Council v. U.S.
E.P.A."9 Furthermore, the relationship between the test data and the
actual effects of the chemical on human beings is uncertain. There is an
imperfect correlation between the effects of toxics on laboratory animals
and the effects of the same chemicals on humans, and a latency period
for toxic effects which make. accurate determinations difficult, if not
impossible."' In sum, various problems with testing hazardous
206. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(3)(B) (1988).
207. Congress estimated that TSCA will cost the chemical industry between $100
to $200 million a year. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4503. Don R. Clay, ex-director of
OTS, said, "it is ironic that more resources are being spent to get industry to do the
testing than the testing would have cost." 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 8, 9 (May 3, 1985).
208. See supra text accompanying note 203.
209. 595 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Instead of initiating rule making
proceedings the EPA used to accept voluntary testing programs negotiated and
conducted by manufacturers or processors. Id. at 1259. These voluntary agreements
would take less time and resources than a lengthy, formal rule making process. Id.
The court found that the voluntary testing programs were contrary to the legislative
history of TSCA, which expressly called for testing rules. Id. at 1260-61.
Furthermore, the failure to utilize testing rules circumvented several important
requirements of TSCA such as public notice, pre-market scrutiny before new
chemicals are manufactured, recordkeeping, sanctions for noncompliance with test
rules, preemption of state and local programs, judicial review of test rules, and citizen
suits. Id. at 1261.
210. See Patricia L. Lang, Changes in the Life Span of Research Animals Leading
to Questions About Validity of Toxicology Studies, 14 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1518,
1518 (Jan. 11, 1991) (indicating that recent decrease in life span of laboratory rats
used for chronic rat studies has raised questions about the validity of researchers'
conclusions);Barbara J. Cullington, Toxic Substances Legislation: How Well Are Laws
Being Implemented?, 201 SC. 1198, 1199 (Sept. 29, 1978) (stating that very few toxic
substance data is incontestable: "[ulncertainty prevails in the regulatory arena");
Thomas H. Maugh, II, Chemical Carcinogens: Scientific Basis forRegulation, 201 SC.
1200, 1200-03 (Sept. 29, 1978) (latency period of 20 years or more exists between the
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chemicals have made it difficult to determine their effects, and
consequently toxics have not been banned.
The EPA has moved very slowly in implementing TSCA,211 a factor
which has also contributed to the absence of product bans. A reason for
the lack of progress is that the agency is wary of having regulations
overturned in court, which would send them back to the drawing
board.212 Moreover, the EPA is chronically understaffed,213 and the
volume of new chemicals to be evaluated under TSCA alone is
overwhelming.
1 4
Furthermore, the EPA has been reluctant to properly implement
TSCA. A prime example is the first PCB ban which the agency
promulgated, prior to the ban currently in force. This ban effectively
exempted 99.3% of the PCBs which were in use, thus "banning" a mere
0.7%.215 This behavior indicates a general disregard for the purpose of
TSCA and the Congressional intent. By issuing a ban which really was
not a ban, the EPA chose a policy of stalling as opposed to strong action
in the toxic arena. This weak illusion of regulation did not go unnoticed
by the District of Columbia's Court of Appeals, which overturned the
"ban" for failure to meet the "substantial evidence" standard.21 The
first exposure to a carcinogen and the onset of cancer; difficult to track victims down;
inaccuracies in extrapolating animal results to humans); Thomas H. Maugh, II,
Chemical Carcinogens: How Dangerous Are Low Doses?, 202 SC. 37, 37 (October 6,
1978) (animal toxicity extrapolation is now so inexact that it is useless in a predictive
sense).
211. Frankel, supra note 205, at 43-45.
212. Id. at 45. This fear is particularly relevant in light of the recent upset of the
EPA's asbestos ban.
213. See Cullington, supra note 210, at 1198; 14 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1498,
1499 (Jan. 11, 1991).
214. Cullington, supra note 210, at 1198.
215. CHEM. W. 18, 18 (June 20, 1980); see also Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1287 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
216. Environmental Defense Fund, 636 F.2d at 1267. See supra notes 138-140 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the substantial evidence standard. Specifically,
there was no substantial evidence to support the Administrator's determination to
classify certain PCB uses as "totally enclosed," Environmental Defense Fund, 636 F.2d
at 1280, or to exclude all materials containing PCB concentrations below 50 parts per
million, id. at 1284. This latter determination is particularly outrageous because
PCBs are toxic at the much more dilute concentration of one part per billion. See
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court stated that the EPA's actions gave "cynics...just cause to sneer at
the effectiveness of governmental regulations" and mocked the EPA's
attempt by labeling the regulations "hardly...a bold step forward in the
battle against life threatening chemicals.1
217
However, there is evidence that bans in general have indeed been
effective. Environmentalist Barry Commoner believes, based on
research that he has done,"8 that the only method which has
significantly improved environmental quality is banning, or virtually
banning, the introduction of the offending pollutants into the
environment."9 Simply limiting pollutants resulted in modest initial
gains, which either soon stopped or reversed.220
Moreover, an EPA study reported that the percentage of the United
States population having more than three parts per million
concentration of PCBs in their bodies has dropped sharply from 8% in
1977 to 1% in 1981."I However, TSCA's success can not simply be
gauged by improved statistics based on product bans because the entire
improvement cannot be attributed to TSCA. Chemical manufacturers
sometimes stop producing toxic chemicals for reasons independent of
regulatory schemes. For example, companies claim that they began
suspending PCB production two years before TSCA was passed, and
believe that they have taken steps to restrict PCBs in excess of what the
regulations require.2" Furthermore, Dupont, the world's largest CFC
manufacturer, announced on March 24th, 1988, that it plans to phase
out production of CFCs because it is convinced of the threat they pose
supra note 81.
217. Environmental Defense Fund, 636 F.2d at 1287.
218. See James E. Krier, The Political Economy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVTL. L.
11, 17 (1990).
219. Id. at 19.
220. Id. "[Tihe decade or more of effort to improve the quality of the environment
teaches us a fairly simple lesson: pollution levels can be reduced enough to at least
approach the goal of elimination only of the production or the use of the offending
substances is halted." Id. at 19-20.
221. CHEM. ENGINEERING 33 (July 11, 1983).
222. Id.
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to the environment.' This phase-out will make it difficult to
determine whether or not TSCA's ban on aerosol uses of CFCs is
effective.
Even if the product bans and testing rules have remained relatively
dormant since the enactment of TSCA, the statute's information
gathering capacities have recently been used in conjunction with other
regulatory programs, and show a glimmer of hope for the future. 4 At
the request of the EPA's Office of Solid Waste, a test rule was
implemented under TSCA which has generated toxicity and
environmental fate data on several chemical substances.' Several
other EPA programs have subsequently begun to request test rules to fill
out data gaps in regulatory programsY6 Perhaps if the EPA will not
use TSCA to ban toxic chemicals, TSCA can be instrumental in utilizing
other environmental schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
TSCA was enacted to protect human health and the environment from
the very real and serious dangers of toxic chemicals. The Act provides,
among other things, product bans as a tool to prevent exposure to
dangerous chemicals. There is nothing wrong with product bans per se,
but only three have been attempted under TSCA, which undermines the
Act's" effectiveness. Furthermore, the poor implementation of TSCA
retards the success of the product bans. Insufficient implementation is
attributed to the pervasiveness of toxic chemicals, the rejection of the
EPA's asbestos ban, the inefficiency of the testing program which the
bans depend on, and the slow or reluctant action by the EPA. It is time
to mandate effective health and environmental policies for our profit
conscious industry.
223. COGAN, supra note 150, at 6. Dupont is one of 19 manufacturers which have
begun multimillion dollar research and development programs to find alternatives
to CFCs. Id.
224. Hayes, supra note 38, at 3-4; see also Hayes, supra note 204, at 58-59.
225. Hayes, supra note 38, at 3.
226. Id.

